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This paper considers a firm, which has to buy mazketable pollution permits in order to be
allowed to pollute the environment. Pollution is an inevitable byproduct of production and in our
model two ways aze offered to deal with it. The first is to buy mazketable permits and the second
is to clean up pollution which can be achieved through investing in abatement capital stock. The
problem is formulated as a dynamic model of the firm and optimal control theory is used to fmd
expressions for productive and abatement investments, and for equilibrium values of productive
and abatement capital stock.
Finally, we determine how the firm reacts on imposition of an emissions tax and a condition is
obtained under which the effects of mazketable permits and an emissions taa on dynamic firm
behavior aze the same. This condition implicitly shows that a standazd result from the environ-
mental economics literature, which is obtained within a static framework, needs to be modified
in order to remain valid in a dynamic context.
(DYNAMICS OF THE FIRM; OPTIMAL CONTROL; POLLUTION CONTROL)z
1. Introduction
Many production processes damage the environment and this is subject of increasing concern in
the world of today. An important question in this respect is what kind of policy instruments the
government, in its role as social planner, should choose to reduce the level of pollution. Baumol
and Oates (1971) found that mazket-based approaches, like taxes and mazketable permits, have
important efficiency advantages over pollution standards, thus restricting pollution emissions
directly. They derived that efficiency requires that abatement methods must be exploited such,
that marginal abatement costs are equal across all methods. In the case of standards it is an
impossible task for the government to fix all standards such that mazginal abatement costs are
equal, while by imposing a tax (or creating a market for pollution permits) marginal abatement
costs aze automatically equalized, because all polluters will abate such that marginal abatement
costs equal the tax (or the price of the permit that clears the market). This result holds under the
assumption that environmental problems develop smoothly and gradually.
But in some circumstances, such as occurrence of unexpected environmental crises that require
rapid changes in the rules of the control mechanism or pollution problems with threshold damage
functions (e.g. Dasgupta (1982), Figure 8.3), standazds can be preferable to taxes. Moreover,
Buchanan and Tullock (1975) argue that firms will prefer emission standazds to emission taxes
because standazds serve as a barrier to entry for new firms so that existing firms collect more
profits. Their argument is based on the view that industry is able to exert its preference for a
particular instrument because it is more likely to be well-0rganized than consumers. Ulph (1992)
obtains that, by analyzing a multiple country game, standards should be preferred to taxes,
because taxes lead to strategic interactions resulting in the choice of an inefficient level of the
non-polluting input where marginal revenue is below the factor price. This will not happen when
countries use standards, because producers are then precommitted to the level of the polluting
input. Furthermore, marketable permits are not successful when the amount of competitors is
small (Hahn (1989)).
Taking all this into account we conclude that the ideal policy package contains a mixture of
instruments, with taxes, marketable permits, standards, and even moral persuasion each used in
certain circumstances to regulate the sources of environmental damage (cf. Baumol and Oates
(1988, p. 190)). Therefore, from a management point of view it is important w know how the
firm must react on imposition of each of these instruments.
This paper focuses on the effects mazketable permits have o0 optimal dynamic firm behavior.
The implications of an emissions tax can be found in Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991) and3
the effects of standards on the growth of the firm are analyzed in Kort (1992). This kind of
reseazch complements the environmental economics literature which until now is mainly
concerned with mazket failure and public policy to correct for mazket externalities.
The implementation of marketable permits involves several steps (cf. Hahn (1989)). First, a
target level of environmental quality is established. Next this level of environmental quality is
defined in terms of total allowable emissions. Permits are then allocated to firms, with each
permit enabling the owner to emit a specified amount of pollution. Firms are allowed to trade
these permits among themselves.
In the USA there has been some limited experience with programs of mazketable permits for the
regulation of air and water quality, while in Europe there is hazdly no experience with mazket-
able permits. The major program of imposing marketable permits as a mechanism for providing
economic incentives for pollution control in the USA is the Environmental Protection Agency's
Emission Trading Program for the regulation of air quality (see Tietenberg (1985)).
Existing systems of mazketable permits in the United States embody a kind of "grandfathering"
scheme involving an initial distribution of emission permits or "rights" among polluters based on
historical emissions. According to Cropper and Oates (1992) a drawback of this system is that
heavy polluters are rewazded by receiving a lot of permits, which they can then use either to
validate their own emissions or sell to other firms. In this way the "Polluter Pays Principle' is
violated.
Compared to taxes a major advantage of the mazketable permit approach is that it gives the
government direct control over the quantity of emissions. Under the taxes approach, the
government must set a tax, and if, for example, the tax turns out to be low, Ixillution still exceed
permissible levels. The government will find itself in the uncomfortable position of having to
adjust and readjust the tax to ensure that the environment is not severely damaged (Cropper and
Oates (1992)).
To study the effects of mazketable permits on optimal dynamic firm behavior we first develop a
dynamic model of the firm which is done in Section 2. In Section 3 the solution is obtained for a
growing firm, thus a firm that starts off small. Perhaps more interesting from a practical point of
view is the case where the firm is at its unregulated optimum in the beginning when regulation in
the form of marketable permits goes into effect. A solution for such a firm is derived in Section
4. In Section 5 the effects of mazketable permiu and an emissions tax are compazed, while the
paper is summarized in Section 6.4
2. Model Eormulation
Consider a firm that has the possibility to invest in two different sorts of capital goods. One is
productive but also causes pollution as an inevitable hyproduct. 1'he other one is non-productive




E(Kt , K~ : amount of emissions being a function of Kt and KZ
K~ - Kt(t) : stock of productive capital goods at time t
KZ - KZ(t) : stock of abatement capital goods at time t
e~ : emission to capital ratio of the productive capital goods
(et ~ 0 and constant)
eZ : abatement to capital ratio of the abatement capital goods
(e2 1 0 and wnstant)
(I)
It is assumed that the firm stazts out without having assigned any capital goods to the abatement
activity yet. Both capital goods evolve according to the standazd capital accumulatioe dynamics:
)~t - [~ - ai Kt , Ki(0) ~ 0 (2)
IC` - IZ - az KZ , IC`(U) - 0 (3)
in which:
I~ - It (t) : rate of investment in productive capital goods at time t
IZ - IZ (t) : rate of investment in abatement capital goods at time t
a~ : depreciation rate ofthe productive capital goods (a~ ~ 0 and constant)
az : depreciation rate of the abatement capital goods (aZ ~ 0 and constant)
Gross earnings of the firm aze given by the instantaneous revenue function S- S(Kt). Assume
that S is twice continuously differentiable, S(Kt) ~ 0 for Kt ~ 0, S~ (Kt) ~ 0 , S~~ (Kt)
c 0, S (0) - 0. ~Function S(K~) is defined as revenue after maximiution with respect to5
variable inputs, e.g. labor]
Investment is cosdy. Let, for i- 1,2, C; (I~ be the cost of investment with C; a convex and
increasing function, C; (I;) 1 0, C; (I;) ~ 0, C(0) - 0.
To reduce pollution the government created a mazket where the firm must buy permits in order
to be allowed to generate emissions. We will assume here for simplicity reasons that once a
permit is bought it remains valid forever (contrazy to e.g. the Wisconsin Fox River Water
Permits which are only valid for five yeazs (Hahn(1989))).
If it has good growth prospects the firm will increase production and, after assuming for the
moment that abatement capital is too costly, this will also increase emissions which implies thaz
the firm needs to buy extra permits. These permits can be sold to other firms at the moment that
the firm reduces emissions by either a sufficient increase of abatement capital stock or a
reduction of production. If the price of a permit equals p(t) and the firm needs one permit per
unit of emissions, then the firm's expenses on the permit mazket at time t equal
p(t)~-p(d{e~~~ -~~}. (4)
Notice that spendings turn into receivings as soon as emissions aze reduced. Whether the price of
a permit will go up or down depends on the behavior of all competitors in the mazket. Leaving
abatement activities aside for the moment, if all firms want to produce more they implicitly want
to increase emissions. Therefore, the demand for emission permits goes up and the price of the
permits increases. Notice in this respect that the amount of permits on the mazket is fixed, which
in turn leads to a fixed amount of emissions generated by the whole sector.
The above description refers to a mazket for polludon permits that provides great flexibility due
to the absence of transactions costs and other obstacles to trading. However, in practice the rules
of the mazketable permits can be so restrictive that the flexibility they offer is more imaginary
than real (see Cropper and Oates (1992), Hahn (1989)). Nevertheless, in this paper we assume
that trading barriers aze absent on the petmit mazket.
The objective of the firm is to maximize the net cash Flow stream:
m
maximize : ( [S (K~) - C~ (I~) - CZ (L~ - p )` (I~ , IZ , Kt , K~] exp (-rt) dt (5)
in which:
r discount rate6
As argued by Pindyck (1991) invesunent ezpenditures aze largely irreversible; that is, they are
mostly sunk costs that cannot be recovered. This comes from the fact that usually capital is firm
or industry specific, that is, it cannot be used productively by a different firm or in a different
industry. To include irreversibility of investmenu in our model we add the following two non-
negativity restrictions:
I~ 2 0 (6)
Iz z 0 (~)
The fact that emissions cannot be negative is covered by the following state constraint:
e~K~-eziCZZO (8)
The decision problem of the firm is to determine an investment path, {I~ (t) , Iz (t)}, over an
infinite planning period [ o,m), such that the objective functional in (5) is maximal, subject to
the constraints (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8).
To obtain the optimality conditions we use Pontryagin's maximum principle (see e.g. Feichtinger
and Hartl (1986)). The current value Hamiltonian and Lagrangian for this problem are:
H- S(K~) - C~(I~) - Cz(lz) - p {e~(I~-a~K~) - e2(12-azK2)} ' 1`~(I~-aiKi) ' A2(Iz-az~
L -H tn~ li'nzlz }W(e~ Ki -e2K2)
in which:
7~;: co-state vaziable belonging to I~; i- 1,2
q;: dynamic Lagrange multiplier belonging to the constraint I~ z 0; i- 1,2
W: dynamic Lagrange multiplier belonging to the state constraint E 2 0
The necessary optimality conditions aze:
- C~ (I~) - pe~ t), ~ t n i- 0 (11)
- Cz (Iz) ~ Pe2 ' 1, z ' n z- 0 (12)
á~ -(r t a~) ~~ - S~ (Ki) - pe~ a~ - pe~ (13)7








In the direct adjoining approach that we óave chosen, the co-state vaziables are continuous
everywhere since H is strictly concave in (I~, I~, provided that the constraints (6), ('7) and (8)
aze not binding at the same time (see e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 168). If furthermore
the transversality conditions
lim exp (- r t) )` ~ (t) [FC~ (t) - K; (t)] 2 0 ; i - l,2 (18)
cym
hold for every feasible solution (K~ , IC~, then (11) -(17) are also sufficient for optimality
since the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in (Ki, KZ).
3. The Optimal Investment Path tor a Growing Fntt
In this section we consider a firm that starts out with a productive capital stock that is below the
equilibrium level. First we study the case where the price ofmarketable permits is constant after
that we analyze what happens when permit prices increase over time, caused by an increased
demand of pollution permits in a growing sector.
3.1 Optimal Solution in Case of Coactant Permit Prices
At the start of the planning period the fum has not invested in abatement capital stock yet,
because KZ (0) - 0(cf. (3)). Due to the fact that productive capital stock is positive in the
beginning (cf. (2)) we conclude that emissioos aze positive, thus restriction (8) is not binding and
p- 0(cf. (17)). From (11) -(14) we derive that as long as p- 0 the optimal time path of
(ti, K~) does not depend on the development of (IZ, K~. Hence, when emissions aze positive we
can determine the optimal investment strategies for productive and abatement capital stock
independent from each other.
In this subsection we first derive the optimal productive investment strategy, after that we study
the optimal abatement investment decision and in the end we put the developments of productive8
and abatement capital stock together. Then we can draw conclusions concerning the evolution of
the amount of emissions over time and study optimal firm behavior in case emission.c become
zero.
3.1.1. The Optimal Productive Investment Decision
Consider investments in productive capital stock in case emissions and productive investments
are positive (~ - n t- 0). Differentiate (11) w.r.t. time and use (13) and (11) to eliminate
á~ and ~~ , respectively. This yields:
Ii - 1 [(r t ai) Ci ' rpei - S~ (Ki)1
C~~ (I~)
We wish to study the differential equation system (2) and (19) in the (K~, I~) phase plane.
The steady state satisfies:
(19)
It' - a~ K~` (20)
S~ (K~~) - (r ~ ai) Ci (Ii') , rpe~ (21)
The ecoiwmic interpretation of the steady state is as follows. The investment rate is maintained
at the constant replacement level, a~K~` , and marginal revenue (left-hand side of (21)) equals
marginal cost (right-hand side of (21)). Compazed to the standazd investment models with convex
investment costs (e.g. Takayama (1985), pp. 698fi99), here mazginal cost has increased with
rpei. This is because owning an additional unit of productive capital stock increases emissions
with ei so that additional permits must be bought at the expense of pe~ which in turn increases
interest costs with rpe~. Notice that buying extra permits does not lead to an increase of
depreciation costs, because depreciation of productive capital stock reduces the amount of
emissions.
The 7acobian determinant of the system (2), (19) and evaluated at the steady state is negative so
that the steady state must be a saddle point. The phase diagram in the (K~, Ii) plane is drawn in
Figure 1. ~) Of course, this diagram only holds in case the amount of emissions is positive.
~) The j- p isocline is drawn as a straight line. This is only for simplicity. 7t~e real shape
depends on S"(K~) and C"(I~).9
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Due to the fact that the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in (I~, I2) we know that investment aze
continuous over time (e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), Corollary 6.2). 7herefore, we can
derive from the phase diagram that i~ can only be zero for very high values of capital stock.
These values do not occur in the optimal uajectory here, because the firm starts out small, i.e.
K~ (0) c Ki' , and then it increases capital stock until the equilibrium value Kj is reached.
After solving the differential equation (13) with p- 0, substituting (11) (with ~~ - 0) into this
relation, and using (21) as a fixed point, we derive that at each moment of time the level of
productive investment must satisfy
({S' (K~ (s)) ~ p e~ a~} exp (- (ai i r) (s - t)) ds - C~ (I~ (t)) - p e~ z 0 (22)
where the left-hand side is the "net present value of marginal investment". For an interpretation
consider the acquisition of an extra unit of capital at time t. The firm incurs an extra expense at
time t in amount of mazginal investment cost C~ plus spendings on extra permits pe~ needed to
account for the additional emissions generated by this extra unit of capital. On the other hand,
the mazginal unit of capital generates - as of time t- a stream of cash inflows consisting of
revenue from selling products (S') and revenue from selling eztra marketable permits (petat).
The latter arises, because extra capital at time t increases depreciation later on and this in tum
decreases emissions. The cash inflow stream is corrected for depreciation by multiplication by
exp (-ai(s - t)) and is discounted to time t by multiplication by exp (-r(s - t)). Condition (22)
states that the net present value of marginal investment equals zero. Hence, the optimal level of
productive investment satisfies the fundamental economic principle of balancing marginal
revenue with marginal expenses.
Following Nickell ((1978), p. 31) we define the "desired value' of capital stock by:
C~ (a~ K~ (t)) ~ pe~ - ( {S' (K~ (s)) ; pe~ a~} exp(- (a~ ; r) (s-t)) ds (23)
From (22) and (23) we obtain { that I~(t) - at K~ (t). In the phase diagram we see that It
decreases over time for K~ c K~' and converges to a~ K~' as soon as Ki becomes equal to
K~` . Therefore K~' (t) will decrease also until it reaches K~' .
Substitution of I~ - a~ K~' (t) into (2) gives:lo
k~ (t) - a~ (K~' (t) - K~ (t)) (24)
Hence, the firm's produaive investment policy satisfies a flezible accelerator mechanism (see
e.g. Gould (1968)) where the desired capital stock level decreases and converges to a constant
K~' .
3.1.2. The Oplimal Abatement Investment Decisiun
Consider investments in abatement capital stock in case emissions and abatement investments are
positive (p -~- 0). Differentiate (12) w.r.t. time and use (14) and (12) to eliminate
~ and )~ , (24) respectively. This yields:
12 - 1 [(r t az) C2 ~' rPez] (2~
CZ (IZ)
We study the (KZ , I~ phase plane based on the differential equations (3) and (2~. The steady
state satisfies:
~. - ~ K2~
(r . a~ C2 (Iz' ) - rPez
(26)
(27)
From (27) we infer that mazginal cost of abatement investment equals mazginal revenue. The
latter consists of a decrease in intere,gt costs which is caused by the fact that the firm needs to
buy less permits, because mazginal abatement investment reduces the amount of emissions.
Also here the determinant of the Jacobian of the dynamic system ((3), (25)) is negative so that
the dynamics correspond to a saddle point. The phase diagram in case of positive emissions is
presented in Figure 2.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
From Figure 2 we infer that abatement investment is constant over time. Thus (26) holds for
every [ime t and substitution of this equation into (3) gives:
tGZ (t) - a2 (K2' - KZ (t)) (28)tl
Hence, the firm's optimal abatement investment policy satisfies the flexible accelerator mecha-
nism with fixed desired level of abatement capital stock. From the phase diagram we also infer
that, due to the continuity property, abatement investments never become zero when emissions
remain positive.
3.1.3. Development ot Finissions over Time
As derived before the development of both capital stocks over time satisfies:
fC~ (t) - a~ (K~' (t) - K~ (t)) , 0 G K~ (0) G K~ (24)
Í~ (t) - aZ (KZ' - KZ (t)) , K2 (0) ' 0 (2g)
in which:
d K~' (t)Idt G 0
lim K~ (t) - K~'
cym
71ius productive and abatement capital stock develop according to the flexible accelerator
mechanism, implying that capital stock grows faster the longer the distance from the present
capital stock level towards the level of desired capital stock. If K~ (0) G K~' the desired value
K~' (t) decreases over time and converges to the steady state value K~' . Then growth is even
more stimulated, especially in the beginning. From (1) we obtain that iso-pollution lines are
given by:
e2 r E
K~ - é~ KZ ei
in which:
E: fixed amount of pollution
Due to (29) we obtain that emissions increase over time when the firm's optimal trajectory in the
KZ - K~ plane is steeper than the iso-pollution line (Figure 3a). The reverse is true when the
optimal trajectory is flatter than the iso-pollution line (Figure 3b). 7'his makes sense because the
optimal trajectory being flatter in the K~ - KZ plane implies that, given the growth of productive12
capital stock, abatement capital stock increases more than necessary to keep pollution on the
same level. Notice that in Figure 3b the firm grows but it can nevertheless sell permits because
emissions decrease over time.
[Place Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 3b it can happen that emissions decrease that fast that they become zero before the
firm has reached its equilibrium. This implies that emissions are negative in (Kt' , KZ' ) so that
the state constraint (8) is violated in this point. Therefore the optimal trajectory must be different
in this case. To obtain the new optimal trajectory we state the following proposition.
Prooosition 1
In case emissions aze negative in the saddle point equilibrium (K~ , K.`' ) the firm will
ultimately reach another steady state (Ítt , Í~) which is situated on the iso-pollution line where
emissions aze zero. This new steady state and the optimal trajectory towazds this point óave the
following properties:
i) IZt and ~ satisfy:
~ S~ (~t) - ez (r , at) ~~ (a~ gt) ` et (r , ~ Gz (a ~ (g0)
e~ t e2 e~ t e2
ii) ÍC~ ~ Kj , ÍtZ c K2'
ei'e2
iii) The optimal trajectory passes into the E - 0- line such that d K~Id KZ is continuous or
I~t and iCq both converge to zero. In the latter case the trajectory intersects the E- 0-
line exactly at (Í~~ , ~).
Proof
See Appendiz.
For an interpretation of equation (30) consider an increase of capital goods with one unit when
the firm is at the steady state (1~t , t~). To keep emissions equal to zero eZl(et f e~ is added
to Kt and eil(et t e~ to KZ (this division is the result of solving two equations with two
unknowns: taking into consideration one additional capital good implies that A Kt t A KZ - 113
and keeping emissions equal to zero results in et ~ K~ - e2 A KZ). Now, we obtain from (30)
that for (Í~t , R~ it holds that mazginal revenue equals mazginal investment cost when mazginal
investment is such that emissions remain zero.
Due to Proposition 1 we conclude that two different solutions can be optimal when the saddle
point equilibrium (K~~ , Ki ) violates the state constraint (8). These solutions are presented in
Figure 4.
[Place Figure 4 about here]
For both solutions it holds that the firm keeps on growing until (fCt , i~ is reached. ~e
difference is that in Figure 4a emissions already become zero during the growth phase, while in
Figure 4b emissions remain positive during the whole growth phase.
3.2 Optimal Solution when Permit Prices are not Constant.
The influence of varying prices of pollution permits on the firm's investment policy, can best be
inferred by using the concept net present value of mazginal investment. Without loss of
generality we restrict ourselves to the case where emissions and investments are positive, thus
p- n~ -~- 0. 71~en for productive investments the net present value is represented by (22)
in case of constant prices. When permit prices vary this formula becomes:
m
r{S~ (Kt(s)) ~ p(s) etat} exp (-(a~ t r) (s - t)~s - Ct (It(t)) - p(t)et - 0 (31)
From (12) (with nZ - 0), (14) and (27) we obtain the following net present value equation for
marginal abatement investment:
~
f- p(s) ~~ exp (-(~ t r) (s - t)) ds - CZ (12(t)) ' P(t) ~- 0 (32)
In order to obtain some results on how changes in permit prices influence the behavior of the
firm let us suppose that this firm is representative for the whole sector. Consider the solution of
Figure 3a where the firm grows and also emissions increase over time until the equilibrium is14
reached. Then capital stock as well as emissions remain constant. Because the firm is assumed to
be representative it also holds for all firms in the sector that they are growing and that iso-
pollution lines are Flat, thus the clean up productivity of abatement capital stock is relatively low.
This implies that total demand for pollution permits is low in the beginning but goes up later on.
Therefore, the price of the permits that clears the mazket will be low in the beginning, it will
increase over time, and it will end up at a constant level as soon as the firms have reached their
stationary equilibrium.
As can be inferred from (31) higher permit prices in the future imply that productive investments
increase in the beginning. Economically this can be explained by noting that it is less costly to
increase pollution when the permit price is still low. Thus growth is relegated to eazlier time
periods so that in the end the productive investment rate is lower. This implies that the amount
of emissions will not grow so much later on and, therefore, less permits need to be bought when
the price is high. From (32) we obtain that for abatement investments the reverse is true. When
the permit price increases over time abatement investment will be low in the beginning and high
later on. From an economic point of view this is easy to understand, because it is better to cleart
up when the price of pollution is high. Then less permits need to be bought against a high price.
In Figure 5 we compaze the optimal uajectories for a constant permit price and a permit price
that follows the trend of the seMOr. Here, we assume that the permit price is the same in the
end, which results in the same equilibrium for both cases2) We conclude that under a first
increasing and then constant permit price pollution increases more in the beginning but arrives at
the same level in the end. Notice that it is even possible that pollution decreases when the
equilibrium level is approached, which will be the case when the optimal trajectory is flatter than
the iso-pollution line. Hence, buying pollution permits is relegated to the beginning of the
planning period, i.e. when the price is low.
~Place Figure 5 about here)
Notice that the effect shown in Figure 5 will be intensified when all firms in the sector act the
same way. Then we get a faster increase of total pollution in the beginning, resulting in a faster
2) Actually, when p is not constant the equilibrium levels aze given by
S~ -(r t a~) Ct (a~ Kt') t rpe~ - pet and (r t aZ) CZ (aZiC~ - rpeZ - peZ. But
here we have assumed that Q- 0 as soon as the firm reaches its equilibrium so that the
steady state values still satisfy (21) and (27).15
increase of the price of pollution permits. Then, according to (31) and (32), productive capital
stock increases more and abatement investments decrease in the beginning.
4. The Optimal Investment Path tor a Contracting Firm.
Here we consider the practically interesting case where the firm finds itself at the unregulatad
steady state capital stock level when pollution regulation goes into effect (this is unlike Haztl
(1992) who analyzes the case where the firm anticipates beforehand on the moment that
regulation comes into force). Then according to the standazd investment literature (e.g. Nickell
(1978)) the initial level of productive capital stock satisfies:
S~(K~(0)) - (r ~ a~) C~ (a~K~(0)) (33)
Also here we still assume that at time point zero the firm has not invested in abatement capital
stock yet, thus KZ (0) - 0.
Like in the previous section, let us first suppose that the price of a marketable permit is constant
over time. 7hen, when emis.si~ns are positive over the whole planning period, Figures 1 and 2
aze still valid.
From (21) and (33) we infer that the equilibrium level is below the initial level of productive
capital stock. Due to Figure t we know that then productive investments increase over time and
that it is even possible that there is an initial time period where produMive investments aze zero.
From (11), (13) (with p. - 0) and (21) we obtain that this is the case when it holds that:
Ci(0) t pei ~ Í{S~ (K~(s)) t peta~} exp (-(ai ; r) (s - t)) ds (34)
Hence, productive inv{estments aze zero in case mazginal expenses exceed future cash inflow due
to mazginal productive investment.
When I~ is not zero the optimal productive investment policy satisfies the flexible accelerator
mechanism (24), but the difference is that now K~ (t) increases over time, due to the fact that It
increases (cf. (2), (24)).
According to Figure 2 we conclude that IZ is constant over time and thus the flexible accelerator
mechanism (28) still holds too. The optimal trajectory in case emissions aze positive during the
whole planning period is depicted in Figure 6.16
[Place Figure 6 about here]
It is cleaz that emissions decrease over time and, therefore, it can be possible that they decrease
to zero already before the saddle point equilibrium is reached. Then Proposition 1 becomes valid
again. In order to make a comparison between the initial value of productive capital stock a~
the new steady state 1~~ we rewrite (30) as follows:
s~(1Z~) - (r ; ai) ~i (ai~i) ' ~ (r ~ ~) ~i (ai~ (35)
Now we can conclude from (33) and (35) that R~ is lower than K~(0). A further application of
Proposition I leads to the optimal trajectories, as depicted in Figure 7.
[Place Figure ~ about here]
At the end of this section we study how the firm's investment policy is influenced when the
permit price follows the trend of the sector in stead of being constant. Like in Subsection 3.2 we
assume that the development of the firm is symptomatic for the whole sector, implying that
emissions decrease until they become constant when the firms have reached their equilibrium
value. We assume here that all firms behave like in Figure 6, leaving the possibility of emissions
becoming equal to zero aside. As long as emissions decrease the demand for pollution permits
decreases also, and therefore the price of such a permit will diminish over time.
As can be inferced from (31) a lower permit price in future implies a decrease of producdve
investments in the beginning. An economic reason for this behavior is that as long as the permit
price is high it is better for the firm to reduce pollution as much as possible resulting in the
decrease of productive investments.
Of course, abatement investments aze more profitable when the cost of pollution is high, thus
when the price of marketable permits is high. 7herefore, compazed to the case of constant permit
price, the firm will increase abatement investment in the beginning of the planning period and
reduce them later on.
How does the optimal trajectory change compazed to the case of a constant permit price? In the
beginning ~)~~~ increases but also iC2 so that nothing cart be said beforehand about how
dK~IdK2 is influenced. But we ~p conclude that productive capital stock decreases faster and
abatement capital stock increases faster in the beginning when the price of a mazketable permit
follows the trend of the sector. This leads to a faster decrease of emissions on an initial time17
interval.
S. A Comparison between the Etfects of Marketable Permits and an Emissiortv Tax.
In stead of creating a market for pollution permits the government can also impose an emissions
tax to reduce pollution. Then the firm's objective function becomes:
~
maximize: ~[S(Ki) - Ct (I~) - CZ (I~ - r(e~K~ - e2K~] exp (- rt) dt
in which:
r: emissions tax rate (r ~ 0 and constant)
The optimal control problem is to maximize (36) subject to (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8). Similar
calculations like in the model with mazketable permits leads to the following results. In case
emissions are non-negative the firm's equilibrium value of productive capital stock is given by:
S~(K~..)-(rtai)C~(a~K~r~);re~ (37)
At each moment of time the level of productive investment must satisfy:
~ {S' (K~ (s)) - r et} exp (-(ai ; r) (s - t)) ds - C~ p~(t)) - 0 (38)
Increasing the productive capital stock with one unit results in marginal expenses to the value of
C~ and an extra stream of revenues over the remaining planning period. It also results in an
extra stream of emissions tax payments, because higher productive capital stock leads to an
increase of emissions. Hence, according to (38) the firm fixes its productive investment rate such
that the discounted cash inflows and outflows, which aze due to marginal investment, are
balanced. Abatement investments are con.stant and determined by the following equation:
(r ~ ~ C2 ~~Z) - T P2 (39)
In case emissions are negative in the saddle point equilibrium, the new steady state is also here
represented by (30).l8
After comparing (21), (22) and (27) with (37}(39) we can conclude that marketable permits and
an emissions tax lead to the same results if it holds that:3)
rpsr
To understand this equation consider the marginal pollution costs under both instruments. If
during a certain period with one unit time length the firm owns one extra unit of productive
capital stock, emissions aze increased with et. in case the govetnment has imposad an emissiona
tax the firm has to pay an extra tax to the value of r e~ .
Under marketable permits the firm has to buy extra permits at the expense of p e~ in order to be
allowed to increase emissions with et during that period. After the period is over these permits
can be sold again. Hence, the fu-m needs p et units of money only during this time period which
results in interest costs that equal r p ei 4)
The result that an emissions tax and mazketable permits have the same performance when
[ D- 7 is a kind of dynamic extension to the analysis of Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 58), who
obtain within a staiic framework that imposing a tax or introducing pollution permits lead to the
same results when p- r. Hence, they do not take into account the difference that under
marketable permits the firm only has to pay once, which is at the moment that the permit is
bought, while under an emissions tax the tax payment comes back every period.
6. Summary
In this paper we studied the effects marketable permits have on the firm's dynamic investment
policy. It was assumed that the firm can invest in capital stock that is used to produce goods and
it can also invest in a second kind of capital stock through which the firm can reduce its
emissions.
It turned out that the equilibrium of productive capital stock is such that mazginal revenue equals
3) Here it is important to notice that (22) can be rewritten into:
( S' (K~(s)) exp (-(a~ t r) (s - t)) ds -C~ (It(t)) - ~e~ - 0 And (38) is
{ m a~ 4 r re
equivalent with: ~ S' (K~(s)) exp (-(a~ f r) (s - t)) ds -C~ (I~(t)) - a } r- 0.
t
4) In case permits aze only valid during a fuvte time-interval polludon costs not only consist
of interest costs, but also of depreciation costs in order to account for the fact that the
value of a mazketable permit decreases over time.19
the sum of marginal productive investment costs and pollution costs, while for the equilibrium of
abatement capital stock it holds that the marginal reduction of pollution costs balances marginal
abatement investment costs. During the whole planning period productive investment is
determined such that the net present value of marginal investment equals zero, while abatement
investment turns out to be constant. Furthermore, we determined the effects of a non-constant
price of a marketable permit.
Finally, we proved that the implications of imposing an emissions tax or introducing a market
for pollution permits are the same whea the tax rate equals the interest rate multiplied by the
price of a marketable permit. In this way we implicitly showed that the result of Baumol and
Oates (1988), who obtained within a static context that both instruments lead to the same
performance when the tax rate equals the petmit price, does not hold in this dynamic framework.
It would be valuable to study whether our result also holds in oiher dynamic models of the firm,
for instance when the pollution function is non-lineaz, or in a dynamic game where several firnts
aze decision makers whicó all operate on the same market for pollution permits. Then strategic
interactions could occur, i.e. a firm can buy more permits than it needs for its own pollution in
order to obstruct growth of its competitors. Another interesting eztension is to consider permits
that expire after some time in stead of remaining valid forever. In that case the limited validity
of pollution permits would certainly lead to the occurrence of depreciation costs of permits in
our rule.~
Appendfx. Prroof ofProposition I
To calculate the steady state when E- 0 we put t,t - nZ -~i -~Z - 0, substitute (1) in (3),
(2) in (4), and obtain:
et p-(r t at) Ct (a~ ~~) t rpet - S~ (Qt) (A1)
e2 ta - rPe2 - (r ' ~ Ci (ai ~ (A2)
Notice that in case of E- 0 the state constraint (8) is binding so that p can be positive. If we
multiply (A2) with e~l(et t e~ and subtract this fmm (AI) . eZl(et t e~ we obtain property (i)
~ The author thanks Antoon van den Elzen and Piet Verheyen (both Tilburg University)
for providing valuable commenu. This research has been made possible by a fel-
lowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.20
of Proposition 1.
To determine the position of (ÍC~ , k~ relative to the saddle point equilibrium (Kt' , KZ'),
first observe that from (21) and (27) we can derive:
~ S (Ki ) - ~ Ct (ai K~~) - e~ Cz (az K2~) - 0 (A3)
ei'eZ e~}e2 ei'eZ
From (30) and (A3) we conclude that both (R~ , RZ) and (Ki , KZ') are situated on the
following curve in the K~ - KZ plane:
~ S~ (K~) - ~ C~ (a~ K~) - e~ CZ (aZ K~ - 0
e~ ' e2 ei ' e2 ei t eZ
(A4)
This curve has negative slope and, after taking into account that emissions aze zero in(ï~t ,~)
and negative in (K~ , KZ' ), we conclude that property (ii) of Proposition 1 must be valid.
Due to (tl) and (12) we obtain that continuity of ~i and ~'unplies that I~ and IZ are also
continuous. This in turn implies that 1~~ and I~ are continuous so that property (iii) of
Proposition 1 must be valid too.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Optimal trajectory of p~, K~) when the amount of emissions is positive.
Figure 2. Optimal trajectory of (I2, KZ) when the amount of emissions is positive.
Figure 3. Optimal trajectories of (Kt, K~ with increasing (a) and decreasing emissions (b),
where for the iso-pollution lines it holds that E~ C EZ c E3.
Figure 4. Two possible solutions when (Ki' , KZ' ) violates the state constraint (8).
Figure 5. Optimal trajectories where thepermit price is constznt (- -) or follows the trend of
the sector (-).
Figure 6. Optimal trajectory in case the firm starts out at its unregulated optimum.
Figure 7. Two possible solutions in case the firm starts out at its unregulated optimum and
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